Making History Module Essay by Sarah Donnison

This patrol report was created in 1950 in the Eastern Highlands district of Papua New Guinea. It is inclusive of the patrol objectives, a letter from the District Officer, another letter from the Patrol officer, an introduction, a diary of events, a document of observations, a review of the Native Constabulary present on patrol, and rough sketch maps of the area patrolled. The objectives of this patrol were to explore the area, to contact native groups and gather intel on their population/territories, and to find an airstrip site if there are large populations in the area.[1] The party was made up of one corporal, five constables, one administration interpreter, one medic and forty-nine Carriers. The area to be explored was South of Mount Michael, known to be unexplored, however, the group deviated from this plan due to issues among the party concerning food, fear and hydrophobia.[2] The patrol begins on 3 July 1950 and ends on 12 August 1950 the total of days travelled were 40 days.

The diary portion of this report provides day-by-day insight into this patrol’s journey. The first few days have minimal details, only describing the movements of the party, heights and wet weather. The forest is described as thick, and the group dealt with leeches and scrub-itch mites on the journey.[3] Animals they encountered were cassowaries, snakes and hornbills which were often hunted for food. The party also met with other Patrol officers on their journey. On 10/7/50, notes and maps were compared with Officer Carey and they parted ways on 11/7/50.[4] On 14/7/50, the group met up with Mr Young-Whitforde, again comparing notes and maps but stayed together until 20/7/50. Some contact was made with native groups. A previously known group at Meiyahurei was lectured about the importance of building a road.[5] A new group was found at Aro’Itei and described as shy but curious. This group is noted to have worn crescent-shaped duralumin jewellery.[6] Another group was contacted at Udiebi, who were apprehensive, but peace was maintained with the patrol group. In Songhe, contact was made with a large family where one member volunteered to act as a guide for the patrol to find the next native group.[7] Issues with food began on 22/7/50, with reports of the rations not fit to be eaten and gave members of the party upset stomachs, and so was purged. The Songhe guide led the party towards a possible location for food and people, however, it required the party to build canoes and travel on the Tsubu River until it met the Pio River. The next day, the Songhe guide had disappeared.[8] The patrol decided to continue forwards, following the directions that the Songhe guide provided, in hopes of encountering refuge at Tsubu-Pio junction. At this point, the weather worsened and there was uneasiness among the party during the journey. They travelled in this state along the river for 6 days. The river junction was reached, however, there was nobody to be found.[9] Supplies were exhausted, Carriers refused to eat the sago supply that was found, and some men needed to be carried by stretcher on the trip back. Due to the storm, the river had flooded and made the journey back difficult. Only until the party reached familiar territory did spirits lift and fresh food was provided at those villages.

There was a distinct divide amongst the party between the officers and Carriers. The officers had a duty to keep the Carriers safe and continue with the mission of the patrol. During the first week, some Carriers had decamped during the night, presumably to go home and so the officers made a minimal effort at this point to find them.[10] During contact with one of the native groups, the Carriers were noted as unsettled as officers attempted to make contact. There were also superstitions which the Carriers shared between themselves by being in new territories. At this time, a few Carriers decamped to go home but were found by officers and brought back to the camp with a warning to not leave again.[11] When the patrol reached the river, it was discovered that many of the Carriers could not swim or were too scared to go into the water. Officers had to organise the cargo to waned down the river while many men walked on foot, single file by the bank. Some of the Carriers ended up in the water, either because they wanted to try swimming, or they had slipped in due to the storm. Some had to be rescued by officers and at least one had drowned. Since then, officers became strict on the Carriers and divided the party up to accompany each raft.[12] Another carrier was presumed drowned after an attempted rescue. Organising a time to cross the river was difficult. Officers needed to find a safe place to do so, some Carriers tried crossing on their own and were swept away by the current, never to be found. A carrier was also burned by boiling water that night during camp, he was treated but remained badly burned. Carriers resorted to eating nuts, though informed not to by officers, which lead to severe stomachaches.[13] During the journey, some offers also became afflicted with injuries and illness. Corporal Anton was treated for a badly infected foot,[14] Constable Kausingut was treated for swollen testes caused by insect bites[15] and Constable Enava was reported sick.[16] The route back was shortened due to Enava’s condition. He also fell in the river due to a leg injury and was referred to a nearby hospital upon return.[17]

Reading With and Against the Grain

This report highlights the struggles that the Australian colonial administration endured to expand governmental control in the highland.[18] This was due to the Pacification agenda, the highlands were difficult to navigate during the beginning of colonisation, which in turn prolonged the status of ‘uncontrolled’ in many of these areas.[19] The persistence of this patrol to continue forward, despite their hardships, provides insight on the importance of Australian administrative control throughout the highlands.[20]

Attached to this report is a personal statement from Eisenhauer, the Patrol Officer. Within this statement, he defends the decisions which were made under his command. He believed himself to be the leader and authority figure of the group, which is shown in his decision making, commands to the group, consideration for safety and ‘head of the group’ positioning.[21] He regards the Carriers as rowdy and disobedient from the beginning of the patrol, which over time irritated Eisenhauer.[22] So, he justifies the decisions he made during the patrol and does not accept any responsibility, shifting blame to the Carriers who ‘presumedly’ died or went missing.[23] With all these in mind, Patrol Officer Eisenhauer seems strong-headed and stubborn which may have impacted the recall of the events in this personal statement.

There is a shared assumption between the patrol officer and his superiors that volunteer Carriers were committed to their role, understood the risks involved and viewed party leaders as authority figures. This can be seen in the report introduction which lists the issues associated with the Carriers for this patrol.[24] As these assumptions were not met by Carriers during the patrol, the mission was deemed partially unsuccessful. It was also assumed that having volunteer natives as a part of the patrol would ease tensions when the party encountered new groups.[25] This, however, was not the case when the patrol met a new group at Udiebi. The Carriers were described as “very restless” which is suggested to have complicated the first contact protocols.[26] From these assumptions, we can learn that there was a divide between the leading members of the patrol group and the Carriers.

There is an unsaid assumption that the patrol has the authority and right to explore uncharted areas and declare them as uncontrolled.[27] This suggests a colonial common sense regarding ‘watermarking’ because the government has declared the whole land as their own already.[28] So, patrols were under the assumption that they were already owned the land and native groups needed coaxing for cooperation using the promise for education, health care and trade. This is also reflected in the authority within the patrol group which reflects Stoler’s description of essences.[29] The order of authority begins with Eisenhauer, the educated white male, then trickles down to the native police who have had colonial education and then lands on the Carriers, who have had little.

By reading this Patrol Report against the grain, insight about cultural behaviours and differences between native groups and the Carriers is provided. When encountering the people at Aro’Itei and Udiebi, the Patrol group was shown differences in behaviour. The first being shy but friendly over time and the latter was apprehensive but curious.[30] According to Anas, these were common reactions for people when meeting white men.[31]  The patrol officer, Eisenhauer, looked alien due to his physical appearance, inclusive of skin colour, facial features, clothing and new technology.

Throughout the report, the Carriers are recorded to have been restless and disobedient, which may have occurred due to internal power struggles within the Patrol Group and general uncertainties of being in new areas. Sahlins discusses the meaning of big-men in the context of Melanesian cultures.[32] With a group which is formed from an already tight-knit community from the Kami area,[33] a power structure between these men may have been altered and provided a chance for some men to prove themselves as a worthy centre-man.[34] This could explain the disobedience which the patrol officer experienced with the Carriers during the patrol. Eisenhauer was no longer the mystifying white man to this group of natives because they have been able to humanise him due to regular contact with colonialists. As he did not provide proper shelter or food for the Carriers, they would have lost respect for him over time and thus lost any authority which Eisenhauer believed he had over the group. Between the Carriers, they may have competed to find a ‘Big-man’ new leader of the patrol group which would explain the risky actions such as overcoming fear of the water and jumping onto the rafts.[35] This could also explain why the Carriers refused to eat Sago and chose to eat green nuts It was deliberate defiance of Eisenhauer that simultaneously new loyalty to the new Big-man within the group of Carriers.[36]

Summary

This Patrol Report tracks the route and events of the Patrol Group led by Eisenhauer in 1950. Their track begins in Goroka, travelling south past Mount Michael and just passes the boundary of New Guinea and Papua. Their initial goals are to explore the terrain, contact natives and gauge the populations, and find a space to allocate a future airstrip site. This occurs during the wet season, and they trek through rain and stormy weather. Their journey involves encounters with other native groups, inclusive of old and new contacts. At these villages, the party stocks up on food and push colonial agendas such as medicine, education and road building. This depends on the level of trust that is gained.

After passing Songhe, the Patrol Group does not encounter any more native villages, but they believe there to be a population if they follow the Tsubu river until they reach the junction of Pui. It is this part of the patrol where events turn for the worst. Their food supply becomes inedible, resulting in a shortage. The weather causes some sleepless nights, and the river starts to flood. To continue forward, rafts were constructed for easier travel. However, it was later found out that many Carriers could not swim, and some were presumed drowned. When the junction is reached, there is only an abandoned farm. At this point, the Patrol Group retraced their steps back up the river and took a short detour to return to Goroka as quickly as possible to treat the wounded.

Bibliography

Anas, M., ‘The Highlands of Australian New Guinea’, Geographical Review, 50/4 (1960), 467-490.

Brown, P., ‘Colonial New Guinea: The Historical Context’, in N. McPherson, ed., In Colonial New Guinea (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001, 15-26.

Cohn, B.S., Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Eisenhauer D.W., ‘Patrol Report No. 3/1950-1951’, Patrol Reports, (3 July-12 August 1950), National Archives of Papua New Guinea, Eastern Highlands, Goroka, 3, 122-146, https://library.ucsd.edu/dc/object/bb07526564, accessed 10 September 2021.

Sahlins, M.D., ‘Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-man, Chief: Political types in Melanesia and Polynesia’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5/3 (1963), 285-303.

Stoler, A.L., Along the Archival Grain: epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

Turner, A., Historical Dictionary of Papua New Guinea (The Scarecrow Press Inc, 2001), xxxiii-l.


[1] D.W. Eisenhauer, ‘Patrol Report No. 3/1950-1951’, Patrol Reports, (3 July-12 August 1950), National Archives of Papua New Guinea, Eastern Highlands, Goroka, 3, 128, https://library.ucsd.edu/dc/object/bb07526564, accessed 10 September 2021.

[2] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 129.

[3] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 131.

[4] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 130-132.

[5] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 130.

[6] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 131.

[7] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 132.

[8] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 133.

[9] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 135-136.

[10] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 130.

[11] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 133.

[12] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 134.

[13] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 135.

[14] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 133.

[15] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 135.

[16] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 136.

[17] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 137.

[18] A. Turner, Historical Dictionary of Papua New Guinea (The Scarecrow Press Inc, 2001), xli.

[19] P. Brown, ‘Colonial New Guinea: The Historical Context’, in N. McPherson, ed., In Colonial New Guinea (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 22.

[20] B.S. Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 6.

[21] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 124.

[22] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 126.

[23] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 127.

[24] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 129.

[25] Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: The British in India, 8.

[26] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 131.

[27] Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: The British in India, 6.

[28] A.L. Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 8

[29] Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense, p. 4

[30] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 130-131.

[31] M. Anas, ‘The Highlands of Australian New Guinea’, Geographical Review, 50/4 (1960), 468.

[32] M.D. Sahlins, ‘Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-man, Chief: Political types in Melanesia and Polynesia’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5/3 (1963), 289

[33] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 128.

[34] Sahlins, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 290.

[35] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 134.

[36] Eisenhauer, Patrol Reports, 132.

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